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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTAH BANK & TRUST,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

REPLY BRIEF

vs.
Supreme Court No.

JAMES H. QUINN and
JAMES H. QUINN, JR.,
Defendants-Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF
I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Court should note that the statement of facts given in the Res•
pondent' s brief is ambiguous and does not correctly state the evidence presente
'1

to the Court below.

Respondent states on page 3 of its brief "it was mutually,,

decided that the automobiles be sold through local dealers."

There is no evi-

dence in the case of any such agreement between any of the parties that the
automobiles be sold through local car dealers.

In fact, the testimony of Mr.

Jay Quinn was that he tried to get the bank to allow the vehicles to be taken

out of state where a higher price could have been obtained and the bank
to do so. (Tr. 2l6).

12

1

refus+

The Respondent failed to cite any portion of the trans-

cript of the trial wherein such an agreement was made.

The statement of coun- ~

sel that it was mutually decided that the automobiles be sold through local
car dealers is a mis-statement of the evidence.

The Respondent at page 3 of
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its bri~f states, "Shortly after the December 23, 1977 meeting, the parties
undertook to sell the cars and the boat."

A more correct statement of the

facts would be that it was the understanding that everyone would participate
in the sales.

However, the bank refused to allow the Defendants to participate

in the sale of the cars and, in fact, refused to allow Jay Quinn to take the
Ferrari to Arizona where a much higher price could have been obtained than
that for which the bank sold it in Utah. (Tr. 216).
II. ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE MAJORITY RULE OF "NO NOTICE NO DEFICIENCY" IS THE UTAH RULE
Respondent argues in its Point One that the failure to give notice
of sale of collateral under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code does not
preclude Plaintiff from obtaining a deficiency judgment.

The Respondent admits

at page 7 of its brief that many jurisdictions hold that a failure to give
notice to the debtor of the sale of collateral constitutes an absolute bar to
a deficiency.

The Respondent, however, fails to note this is the majority

position and to include the State of Utah within that list of states.

Appel-

lant respectfully submits that FMA Financial Corporation v. Pro Printers,
590 P.2d 803 (Utah, 1979), establishes Utah as one of the states wherein the
"no notice - no deficiency" rule has been accepted.
In a Utah Law Review article entitled "Leases as Security Agreements and the Affect of a Failure to Notify on a Secured Party's Recovery of
a Deficiency Judgment: FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro Printers," 1979 Utah L. Rev·,
567, the author concluded that, based on the cases cited by the Court in reaching its decision in FMA, Utah had adopted the "no notice - no deficiency" rule.
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The "no notice - no deficiency" rule is the majority position in the United
States at this timee

The author further concluded that in the event the Court

decides to retreat from the "no notice - no deficiency" rule, that the language
of FMA then would compel adoption of the so-called Arkansas Rule.

The Arkansas

Rule is that if the creditor fails to give notice as required by the Code, he
then has to overcome the presumption that the repossessed collateral is worth
at least the amount of the actual sale of the collateral or in the alternative,
to show in fact what was a fair and reasonable price for the collateral.
The Respondent failed to point out to the Court the significance
of Clark Leasing Corporation v. White Sands Forest Products, Inc., 535 P.2d
1077 (N.M., 1975) cited at page 8 of the Respondent's brief.

In Clark, the

New Mexico Court recognized that the majority of the states accept the rule
of "no notice - no deficiency".

535 P.2d at 1081.

The Respondent further

failed to point out that the position argued for in Point One is basically the
minority position.

Even if the Court were to adopt the minority position set

forth in Respondent's cases at pages 7 and 8 of the brief, the Court would be
compelled to reverse the trial court because the Plaintiff did not meet its
burden of proof under the so-called "Arkansas Rule".

If this Court adopted

the Arkansas Rule as the law of the State of Utah, then the Appellant would
be entitled to reversal or a new trial on the issue of whether or not the salel
was commercially reasonable, and whether or not the Defendant was damaged by
the failure of the bank to give notice.

The Arkansas Rule as set forth in the

cases cited by Respondent at Pages 7 and 8 of its brief, notably Universal
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l

CIT Credit Company v. Rone, 453 S.W.2d 37, (1970), Beneficial Financing Company
of Blackhawk County v. Reed, 212 N.W.2d 454, (Iowa, 1973), states that for the
creditor to obtain any deficiency at all, it must overcome the presumption
that the value of the collateral was the same as the amount owed on the note.
All of the cases cited by Respondent at pages 7 and 8 of its brief appear
to adopt the Arkansas Rule.

Although, as pointed out in Clark Leasing Corp.

v. White Sands Forest Products, Inc., supra, this is the minority view, the
Respondent still urges that it should be adopted by this Court.
The trial court did not try the case on the Arkansas theory.

The

jury was not instructed with regard to the burden of proof under the Arkansas
Rule.

Under the Arkansas Rule, the bank must prove that the property was not

valued in an amount equal to the amount owed on the note.

At trial, the Court

submitted this case to the jury on the presumption that the Defendant had the
burden of showing that it had been damaged by the failure of the bank to give
notice and/or to conduct the sale in a commercially reasonable manner.

If this

Court reverses the FMA Financial rule of "no notice - no deficiency", and adopts
the Arkansas Rule as urged by the Respondent, the case must be reversed and
sent back to the trial court for a new trial because the Arkansas Rule requires
the secured party to show, by a.preponderance of the evidence, the reasonable
value of the collateral.
to meet that burden.

There was insufficient evidence at trial for Plaintiff

Under the Arkansas Rule, there is a rebuttable presumption

that the collateral is equal to the value of the amount owed on the note.

-4-
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See eog., Universal CIT Credit Co. v. Rone, 453 S.W.2d 37 (Ark., 1970).
The Arkansas Court stated:
Whenever the value of the collateral is an
issue in an action to recover a deficiency,
there is a presumption that it was worth at
least the amount of the debt and the secured
party has the burden of proving the amount
that should have been obtained through a sale
conducted according to law. Id. at 39.
The Court then goes on to state that the amount received at a sale where notice
of the sale is not given to the debtor is no evidence of the value of the collateral.

The Court reasoned:
It is only where the sale is conducted according
to the requirements of the Code that the amount
received or bid at a sale of collateral is evidence of its true value in an action to recover
a deficiency. Id. at 39-40.
As stated by the Court in Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest

Products, Inc., supra:
There is a presumption that the value of the repossessed collateral at resale is equal to the
outstanding debt. Where the sale is conducted
in accordance with Section 9-504(3), the sum received at sale is evidence of the market value.
But if the sale is not conducted according to the
Code (such as when there is a failure to give notice
of the sale to the debtor,) the amount received
is not evidence of the market value of the collateral. The secured party has the burden of proving
the market value by other evidence. (Emphasis added)
535 P.2d at 1082.
A priori, if the Court here rejects the majority rule of "no notice - no

-5-
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deficiency", and adopts the minority Arkansas Rule, the case should be retried.
At the trial, the jury was not instructed that the Plaintiff had the burden
of showing that the collateral was worth less than the amount owed if it
claimed a deficiency.

Also, the jury was not instructed regarding who had the

burden of showing the reasonable value

o~

the collateral.

Respondent places a great deal of emphasis upon the case of Zions
First National Bank v. Hearst, 570 P.2d 1031 (1977).

However, this Court in

FMA Financial, supra, wisely rejected the dicta of Zions First National Bank
v. Hearst, relied upon by Respondent.
The real question in this case turns on the Court's holding in

FMA Financial, supra!'

In FMA.Financial, supra, as rightly pointed out by the

Court, the creditor had completely failed to give the debtor notice of proposed
sale of collateral.

The Court stated that due to the fact that the policy pur-

pose of notice was to allow the debtor to protect its interest and to participate
in causing the collateral to be sold for the best price available, and that
the denial by the creditor of that right to the Defendant should preclude the
creditor from seeking a deficiency.

The Respondent claims that this position

is punitive in nature and repugnant to the spirit of the Code citing certain
sections therefrom.

However, the Court should note that the apparent majority

of jurisdictions which have ruled on the issue have adopted the "no notice no deficiency" rule.

The Appellant urges that the reasoning of the Court in

Delay First National Bank and Trust v. Jacobsen, 19 U.C.P. Reporter 994 (Neb.,
1976), is the correct way to approach the problem.

oleb4..or

In Delay, the Court noted

that no notice was given the ereaitoF and allowed no deficiency.

However, as
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pointed out in Appellant's original brief the policy reason for the "no notice~
no deficiency" rule is obvious.

:i

Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code

brings traditional conunon law principles of equity, justice and fair play into
code practice.

Such policy would suggest that a creditor should not be all~~ ~

a deficiency judgment when he breaks the law.

In the instant case, not only

did the bank fail to give legal notice, the bank also failed to follow the
notice requirement in the boilerplat language of the bank's 6wn documents.
(See e.g. Atlas Thrift Company v. Horne, 104 Ca. Rep. 315, 11 UCP Rep. 417, 426

If the Commercial Code adopts common law principles of fair play and

(1972}}.

equity, i t should preclude a creditor who has broken the law by failing to give
the notices required under Article 9 0£ the Commercial Code from recovering a
deficiency.

Otherwise, the creditor bank could sell the property at a price

substantially below what it was valued as collateral, and what the debtor
claimed it was worth, and then recover a deficiency judgment from the debtor.
See~

Universal CIT Credit Co. v. Rone, supra.

The reasoning of the major-

ity of Courts that compliance with the Uniform Commercial Code for notification

·-·

as to the disposition of collateral is a condition precedent to a secured credi· ~:
tor's right to recover a deficiency, is fair and reasonable and was properly
adopted as the law of the State of Utah in FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro
supra.

Printers,.~:::

As pointed out in the footnote at page 12 of Appellant's original

brief,:;~

the majority of decisions of jurisdictions appear to have adopted the "no notice
no deficiency" rule.

In fact, one of the cases cited by Defendant Clark Leas_!Ej.:::~

Corp. v. Whit'e Sands Forest Products, Inc., supra, notes that even though New
Mexico accepts the Arkansas Rule, the "no notice - no deficiency" rule does
appear to be the majority rule in the United States.

The Appellant respect-

fully submits that "no notice - no deficiency" is a reasonable rule.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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It is

<:

the majority rule.

As enunciated in FHA Financial, this Court should now

forcefully hold that when a bank fails to give notice of the sale of collateral as required by the Code, the bank will not be allowed to recover any
deficiency judgment.
POINT II. THE COURT DID NOT
PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY
In Point Three of the Respondent's argument, the Respondent urges
that the Court did not err in failing to give Defendant's requested Instruction No. 7.

On the contrary, the trial court did err.
If this Court continues to follow the majority rule that a party

cannot recover a deficiency judgment if it does not give notice of the sale,
then of course, Point Three relating to whether or not a jury was properly
instructed becomes moot.

If this Court reverses the "no notice - no deficien-

cy" rule and, instead, adopts the "Arkansas Rule," then the instructions given
by the Court become crucial to the issues in this case.

Since the Plaintiff

bank's burden under the Arkansas Rule is to show, in fact, that the sale was
commercially reasonable and that the price obtained was, in fact, the reasonable value of the collateral, the elements which should be used to decide
whether or not the sale was commercially reasonable have to be articulated
to the jury.
The instructions set forth in the Respondent's brief, to-wit,
Instructions No. 15, 16 and 17, fail to instruct the jury in the elements that
it can legally and lawfully consider relating to the issue of the commercial

reasonablness of the sale and value of the collateral.

First, they fail to

s-tate that Plaintiff-Appellee has the burden to establish the value of the

-8-
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collateral by evidence independent of the sale price.

Also, as pointed out

in the Appellant's original brief at pages 13 through 19, all of the elements
set forth in the Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 7 are elements that
should be properly considered by the jury in making a determination as to
whether or not the sale was commercially

reason~le.

Without having given

that instruction to the jury, the Defendant was prejudiced.

Without this

instruction, there is no basis other than speculation on which to determine
whether or not the sale was reasonable.

Without instruction on the elements

of a commercially reasonable sale, the jury cannot decide if the sale was
reasonable~

There was also, as stated, no instruction on Plaintiff's burden

to prove the value of the merchandise and to rebut the presumption that the
repossessed property's value equalled ·the amount of the note.
POINT III. THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
IN THE CASE TO FIND THE SALE WAS COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE

With regard to the Respondent,. s Point Four, Respondent argues that ·
there is sufficient evidence that the collateral was disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner.

It is clear that if the Court adopts· the Arkansas
I
I

Rule, there was no evidence in the Plaintiff's case which would rebut the pres-1
I

umption that the vehicles were worth the amount owed on the note.

The only

evidence introduced by the Plaintiff as to the value of the vehicles was to
show, in fact, the price at which they were sold.

However, as pointed out by :
I

the New Mexico Court in Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Products,

I~

supra, "if the sale is not conducted according to the Code, the amount received
is not evidence of the market value of the collateral.

The secured party has

-9-
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the burden of proving the market value by other evidence."

Id. at 1082.

Clark

Leasing coupled with the presumption that the value of the repossessed callateral at resale is equal to the value of the outstanding debt compels the conclusion that there is no way that the bank met its burden of proving that it
was entitled to any deficiency judgment.

Therefore, regardless of whether

this Court follows the "no notice - no deficiency" rule of FMA Financial,
supra, or adopts the so-called "Arkansas Rule", the trial court must be reversed.

The bank failed at trial to meet its burden of showing that it was

entitled to a deficiency under either rule.
Therefore, the Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment
awarded to the Plaintiff in the trial court cannot be allowed to stand.
POINT IV. THERE WAS NO CONSIDERA~ION GIVEN TO DR. QUINN
FOR HIS INCREASED LIABILITY UNDER THE DECEMBER NOTE.
In Point Five of the Respondent's brief, the Respondent asserts
that there was legal consideration given to Dr. Quinn for execution of the new
note.

Such contention is wrong.

He has given no new consideration.

The Am

Jur section cited by the Respondent and the case of Southern Frozen Foods v.
Hill, 129 S,E.2d 420, set forth as

Respondent~s

legal basis for the argument

that there was adequate consideration, simply do not apply to the situation
in this case.

Section 227 of Am Jur on Bills and Notes, applies only to a sit-

uation where a new note is given by a third party to cover a pre-existing debt.
It is clear.that in such a situation there is adequate consideration for the
giving of the new note.

However, in this case, Dr~ Quinn had a pre-existing

debt to the bank only in the amount of $180,000.00 and that pursuant to

-10-
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a continuing guarantee which he had given to the bank.

At the time the new

note was signed in December of 1977, the Plaintiff bank converted Dr. Quinn's
$180,000.00·continuing guarantee into a note for $198,000.00.

The additional

$18,000 had been advanced to Jay Quinn, Jr. prior to the time the note was
signed.

Dr. Quinn received no benefit therefrom.

The Plaintiff bank ga.ve

no consideration to Dr. Quinn for the additional $18,000 on the second note.
In Southern Frozen Foods, supra, the Court relied on the fact that the makers
of the note were

pr''~c\'~b

~riaeiples

ceived the benefit.
note.

in a corporation and that the corporation had re-

Therefore, the Court held that they were liable on the

It is clear that a mere naked promise, absent some consideration, to

pay an existing debt of another is not sufficient to create consideration for
a note signed as evidence of said promise.

Am Jur 2d, Guarantee, Section 45.

In the instant case, Dr. Quinn was induced to :sign a note in December of 1977
wherein he became responsible for the pre-existing debt of his son and where
he received no benefit to induce him to become obligated for the additional
$18, 000.

The bank is precluded from enforcing its note as to any sum over and

above the $180,000.
CONCLUSION
The Appellants respectfully submit to the Court that FMA Financial,
supra, places this Court with the majority rule of "no notice - no deficiency.
The judgment of the trial court should, therefore, be reversed.
If, however, this Court modifies FMA and adopts the alternative
position known as the "Arkansas Rule," then this Court is obligated to reverse
the judgment or in the alternative, order a new trial because of the failure
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of the Court below to properly instruct the jury so as to place the burden of
proof on the Plaintiff to overcome the presumption that the collateral was
worth the amount of the note.

The case should, under the "Arkansas Rule",

be reversed based upon the failure of the Plaintiff bank at the trial to produce any independent evidence to rebut the presumption that the collateral was,
in fact, worth the amount itemized in the bank's Security Agreement documents
describing the motor vehicles.
The Court should also hold there was no consideration for the
$198,000 note and $18,000 of said note for lack of consideration.

~~

Respectfully submitted this

day of June, 1980.

David K. Robinson
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
1220 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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~dward T. Wells

Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
1220 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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